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MURKY MATERIALITY & SCATTERED 
STANDARDS:  IN FAVOR OF A MORE UNIFORM 
SYSTEM OF SST DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS 
Megan Ganley* 
 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires corporations to 
disclose their business in or with state sponsors of terrorism (SSTs).  The 
SEC solicits these disclosures with varying standards arising under several 
different mechanisms.  These mechanisms include the requirements of the 
materiality standard, the provisions of Regulation S-K, targeted inquiry in 
individually issued comment letters, and affirmative requirements mandated 
under specific legislation.  Each of these mechanisms requires disclosure of 
slightly different information regarding SSTs with varying degrees of 
exactitude. 
This Note examines the SEC’s current SST disclosure framework, 
considering the benefits, as well as the criticisms, of these disclosure 
mandates.  This Note concludes that, although SST disclosure mandates are 
important, the mechanisms in place result in inconsistent disclosure that 
renders the entire framework ineffective.  This Note argues that a more 
consistent SST disclosure standard is needed and proposes the addition of a 
new line item to Regulation S-K mandating that companies disclose all of 
their business in or with SSTs. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Few concepts seem as unrelated as Barbie Dolls and terrorism.  
Nevertheless, when a news article reported that shops in Iran were selling 
Barbies, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) wrote to Mattel, 
the manufacturer of Barbies, due to Iran’s status as a state sponsor of 
terrorism (SST).1  The SEC requested that Mattel provide an update on its 
 
 1. See Comment Letter from Div. of Corp. Fin., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, to Linda 
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contacts with Iran, as the company’s prior disclosures did not include 
statements regarding the country.2  In response, Mattel replied that, although 
the company was aware of a series of press articles reporting that Iranian 
police had closed down stores selling Barbies, any sale in Iran was “contrary 
to Mattel corporate policy,” and the dolls were either counterfeit or sold 
unlawfully by a third party.3  This correspondence exemplifies SST 
disclosure efforts by the SEC. 
The SEC is a government agency that was founded at the height of the 
Great Depression4 with a mission to “protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, 
and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.”5  The SEC regulates 
financial markets6 by enforcing the federal securities laws—laws rooted in a 
mandatory disclosure regime.7  Under this disclosure regime, companies are 
generally required to disclose information that is material.8 
SEC disclosure requirements occasionally extend beyond exclusively 
financial information and into nonfinancial activities.9  Sometimes, 
nonfinancial information is considered material because of its inherent 
financial impact;10 other times, targeted regulatory requirements mandate 
disclosure of nonfinancial information through legislation and other 
mechanisms.11  This Note focuses on just one type of information that must 
be disclosed:  activities in or with nations designated as SSTs.12  These 
 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/about/what-we-do 
[https://perma.cc/CKC2-NFCV] (last visited Oct. 29, 2021). 
 5. See Robert Hills et al., State Sponsors of Terrorism Disclosure and SEC Financial 
Reporting Oversight 6 (Sept. 8, 2021) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter Hills et al., State 
Sponsors of Terrorism Disclosure], https://ssrn.com/abstract=3592694 
[https://perma.cc/P64R-2W2B]. 
 6. Robert Hills et al., Does State Sponsor of Terrorism Disclosure Limit SEC Financial 
Reporting Oversight?, COLUMBIA BLUE SKY BLOG (May 19, 2020) [hereinafter Hills et al., 
Does State Sponsor of Terrorism Disclosure Limit SEC Financial Reporting Oversight?], 
https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2020/05/19/does-state-sponsor-of-terrorism-disclosure-
limit-sec-financial-reporting-oversight/ [https://perma.cc/S9CK-KCRF]. 
 7. See Allen Ferrell, Mandatory Disclosure and Stock Returns:  Evidence from the 
Over-the-Counter Market, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 213, 213–14 (2007); see also Donald C. 
Langevoort & G. Mitu Gulati, The Muddled Duty to Disclose Under Rule 10b-5, 57 VAND. L. 
REV. 1639, 1640 (2019). 
 8. See Stephen Kim Park, Targeted Social Transparency as Global Corporate Strategy, 
35 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 87, 98–99 (2014) (“The mandatory disclosure obligation under U.S. 
federal securities law is circumscribed by the principle of materiality.  Under this principle, a 
company must only disclose a given piece of information if there is a substantial likelihood 
that a reasonable investor would deem it significant in the ‘total mix’ of available 
information—i.e., what an ordinary, rational investor would consider important information 
in an arm’s length securities transaction.”); infra Part I.B.1 (discussing the materiality standard 
in greater depth). 
 9. See Park, supra note 8, at 98. 
 10. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 11. See Park, supra note 8, at 98, 102–03; infra Part I.B.4. 
 12. Although the list has fluctuated over the years, it presently includes North Korea, Iran, 
Syria, and Cuba. Compare Bureau of Counterterrorism, State Sponsors of Terrorism, U.S. 
DEP’T OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/state-sponsors-of-terrorism/ [https://perma.cc/5UCF-
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disclosures are in part required pursuant to specific legislation,13 but they are 
largely solicited under the general framework of the materiality requirement 
and Regulation S-K.14  The aforementioned letter issued by the SEC to Mattel 
regarding Barbie sales is a typical example of the SEC’s efforts to solicit SST 
disclosures through targeted inquiry via comment letters.15 
This Note analyzes the methods the SEC currently uses to generate SST 
disclosures and considers whether these methods function effectively to 
provide necessary information to the investors who benefit from corporate 
disclosure requirements.16  Part I discusses the SST designation process 
before describing the four principal mechanisms the SEC uses to solicit SST 
disclosures.  Part II then assesses whether current SST disclosure practices 
are beneficial, worthwhile, and effective.  Finally, Part III proposes an 
addition to Regulation S-K that seeks to enhance the uniformity of 
information that companies must disclose regarding their interactions in or 
with SSTs. 
I.  SETTING THE STAGE:  SST DESIGNATION AND SEC REGULATION 
As mentioned above, companies doing business with SSTs are regulated 
by a host of disclosure requirements.17  Before considering mechanisms of 
soliciting SST disclosures, it is useful to survey the legal landscape 
explaining how and why countries become designated as SSTs.  Part I.A 
examines the current SST designation protocol and identifies the countries 
designated as SSTs.  Part I.B explores the various SST disclosure 
requirements that apply to corporations doing business with these countries. 
A.  Defining and Designating SSTs 
A country’s designation as an SST is important to the SEC because the 
designation triggers SST disclosure requirements for companies.18  However, 
 
C5V3] (last visited Oct. 29, 2021), with Memorandum from Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, 
Preparing Your 2017 Form 20-F (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.davispolk.com/sites/ 
default/files/2017-12-14_preparing_your_2017_form_20-f.pdf [https://perma.cc/T3KA-
3MSY] (demonstrating the changing designations over time). 
 13. See infra Part I.B.4 (discussing disclosure requirements under the ITRA). 
 14. See infra Part I.B.1 (discussing SST disclosure requirements under the materiality 
standard). 
 15. See supra note 1; Part I.B.3. 
 16. Although this Note considers a variety of positions, including those of reporting 
companies and the SEC, the default perspective is that of investors, as investors represent the 
cohort to which SST disclosures are directed. 
 17. See supra text accompanying note 14. 
 18. A point of clarification:  “state sponsor of terrorism” is not the sole terrorism 
designation in use.  The term “foreign terrorist organization” designates organizations 
engaging in terrorist activities or retaining the capability and intent to engage in terrorist 
activities, and other designations have also been employed throughout history. Bureau of 
Counterterrorism, Terrorist Designations and State Sponsors of Terrorism, U.S. DEP’T OF 
STATE, https://www.state.gov/terrorist-designations-and-state-sponsors-of-terrorism/ 
[https://perma.cc/ZXU6-S7F5] (last visited Oct. 29, 2021).  The scope of this Note is 
 
2021] MURKY MATERIALITY & SCATTERED STANDARDS 1285 
the SEC does not make these determinations; the authority to formally 
designate a country as an SST resides with the U.S. secretary of state.19  Part 
I.A.1 below discusses more thoroughly the criteria for designating a country 
as a sponsor of terrorism.  Part I.A.2 then discusses the four countries 
currently designated as SSTs and the rationale for their respective 
designations. 
1.  The Legal Framework of SST Designation 
The U.S. secretary of state designates a country as an SST if that country 
repeatedly provides support for international acts of terrorism.20  The 
designation remains until it is rescinded by the U.S. Department of State.21  
The secretary of state’s legal authority to make the SST determination derives 
from three laws:  the Export Administration Act of 1979,22 the Arms Export 
Control Act,23 and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.24 
Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act grants the secretary of state 
the authority to designate a country as an SST if that country has “repeatedly 
provided support for acts of international terrorism,” including by allowing 
any part of the country’s territory to be used as a sanctuary for terrorists.25  
Section 40 of the Arms Control Act similarly grants the secretary of state the 
authority to determine that the government of a country has repeatedly 
provided support for acts of international terrorism.26  Lastly, like § 40 of the 
Arms Control Act, § 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act recognizes the 
secretary’s authority to determine that a country’s government has repeatedly 
provided support for acts of international terrorism.27  Taken together, these 
 
exclusively limited to SSTs.  These differences are only raised to mitigate confusion by 
distinguishing SSTs from other terrorist-related designations. 
 19. See infra Part I.A.2. 
 20. See Bureau of Counterterrorism, supra note 12.  The underlying definitions of a 
“terrorist act” and “terrorism” are complex; indeed, the search for a definition of terrorism has 
been compared to the “quest for the Holy Grail.” See Nicholas J. Perry, The Numerous Federal 
Legal Definitions of Terrorism:  The Problem of Too Many Grails, 30 J. LEGIS. 249, 249 
(2004) (citing Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 41 VILL. L. REV. 1, 119 
(1996)).  Still, the “vast majority” of proposed definitions incorporate the notion of “violence” 
and “political purpose or motivation.” Id. at 251. 
 21. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM, COUNTRY REPORTS ON 
TERRORISM 2016, at 303 (2017) [hereinafter COUNTRY REPORTS 2016]. 
 22. Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the 
U.S.C.); 50 U.S.C. § 4605(j). 
 23. Pub. L. No. 96-28, 82 Stat. 1320 (1968) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
22 U.S.C.); 22 U.S.C. § 2780. 
 24. Pub. L. No. 87-194, 75 Stat. 424 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 22 
U.S.C.); 22 U.S.C. § 2371; see also Bureau of Counterterrorism, supra note 12 (discussing 
the interplay of the three laws). 
 25. 50 U.S.C. § 4605(j).  Interestingly, this act was repealed, but determinations made 
under its provisions are continued by § 1768 of the Exports Controls Act of 2018. See DIANNE 
E. RENNACK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43835, STATE SPONSORS OF ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL 
TERRORISM—LEGISLATIVE PARAMETERS:  IN BRIEF 3 (2021). 
 26. 22 U.S.C. § 2780(d). 
 27. Id. § 2371(a). 
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three acts functionally authorize the secretary of state to designate a foreign 
government as an SST.28 
2.  Countries Currently Designated as SSTs 
There are four countries currently designated as SSTs:  Syria, Iran, North 
Korea, and Cuba.29  Syria has been designated as an SST since 1979, 
followed by Iran in 1984, North Korea in 2017, and most recently, Cuba in 
early 2021.30  The secretary of state is statutorily required to provide a report 
on terrorism to the speaker of the House of Representatives and the U.S. 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations each year, discussing the status of 
terrorism in countries meeting certain criteria.31  Therefore, information 
regarding countries’ SST designations is publicly available via annual 
reports, and further, these reports include detailed information explaining 
why a country is designated as an SST for that particular year.32  Recent 
annual reports shed light on the State Department’s current evaluations of 
SSTs.33 
The Department of State designated Syria as an SST in 1979.34  This 
designation remains today, because the regime of Syrian President Bashar 
al-Assad continues to provide political and military support to terrorist 
groups.35  Further, Syria serves as a “hub for foreign terrorist fighters,” 
providing networks for extremism throughout the Middle East.36  The 
country takes a “permissive attitude” toward terrorist groups such as 
al-Qaeda and ISIS,37 and repeatedly violated its obligations under the 
Chemical Weapons Convention.38 
The Department of State designated Iran as an SST in 1984, and today, 
Iran is considered the most prominent country in the SST arena.39  Iran 
 
 28. See generally RENNACK, supra note 25. 
 29. Bureau of Counterterrorism, supra note 12. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See 2 U.S.C. § 2656f(a).  Since 2004, this report has been published as Country 
Reports on Terrorism. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM, 
COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2005 (2006).  Prior to 2004, the report was published under 
the name Patterns of Global Terrorism. Id. 
 32. See generally 2 U.S.C. § 2656f(a).  Statutory language further specifies which 
activities should be raised and assessed in the report. Id. 
 33. See generally COUNTRY REPORTS 2016, supra note 21; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU 
OF COUNTERTERRORISM, COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2017 (2018) [hereinafter 
COUNTRY REPORTS 2017]; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM, COUNTRY 
REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2018 (2019) [hereinafter COUNTRY REPORTS 2018]; U.S. DEP’T OF 
STATE, BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM, COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2019 (2020) 
[hereinafter COUNTRY REPORTS 2019]. 
 34. See COUNTRY REPORTS 2016, supra note 21, at 305. 
 35. See id. 
 36. See id. 
 37. See COUNTRY REPORTS 2017, supra note 33, at 219–20. 
 38. See COUNTRY REPORTS 2016, supra note 21, at 306. 
 39. See id. at 304.  The 2016 Report labeled Iran “the foremost state sponsor of terrorism,” 
id. at 19, 304, while the 2017 and 2018 reports indicated that Iran remained the world’s 
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provides support for Palestinian terrorist groups in Gaza and terrorist groups 
in Syria, Iraq, and the Middle East at large, and Iran has worked to create 
instability in the Middle East while cultivating and supporting terrorist 
groups abroad.40  Iran is further responsible for intensifying conflicts in 
Afghanistan, Bahrain, Iraq, and Lebanon.41 
North Korea was originally designated as an SST in 1988,42 but the United 
States rescinded the designation in October 2008.43  The designation was 
again reinstated in 2017 because North Korea supported acts of international 
terrorism and violated United Nations Security Council resolutions.44  The 
2018 Country Report on Terrorism also cited North Korea’s involvement in 
assassinations on foreign soil for its renewed designation as an SST.45 
Most recently, the Department of State designated Cuba as an SST on 
January 12, 2021.46  Cuba had been removed from the list in 2015, but it was 
reinstated due to the Castro regime’s support of international terrorism in 
providing a safe harbor to terrorists.47  Additionally, the State Department 
determined that the Cuban government aids “murderers, bombmakers, and 
hijackers” and harbors—and refuses to return—wanted fugitives to the 
United States.48 
Syria, Iran, North Korea, and Cuba are the four countries currently 
designated as SSTs,49 and corporations doing business in or with these 
countries are therefore subject to disclosure requirements. 
 
“leading state sponsor of terrorism,” COUNTRY REPORTS 2017, supra note 33, at 8; COUNTRY 
REPORTS 2018, supra note 33, at 9. 
 40. COUNTRY REPORTS 2016, supra note 21, at 304. 
 41. COUNTRY REPORTS 2017, supra note 33, at 218. 
 42. Id. at 217. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See COUNTRY REPORTS 2018, supra note 33, at 211. 
 45. See id. 
 46. Bureau of Counterterrorism, supra note 12. 
 47. Michael R. Pompeo, U.S. Announces Designation of Cuba as a State Sponsor of 
Terrorism, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Jan. 11, 2021), https://2017-2021.state.gov/u-s-announces-
designation-of-cuba-as-a-state-sponsor-of-terrorism/index.html [https://perma.cc/T58D-
X87P]. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Bureau of Counterterrorism, supra note 12.  Because the State Department reevaluates 
annually which countries are designated as SSTs, there are several countries formerly 
designated that have had their designations rescinded.  The State Department removed the 
People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen from the list in 1990, although the country was 
designated an SST since the list’s origination in 1979. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF 
COUNTERTERRORISM, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 1990, at 32 (1991).  Libya, also on 
the original list, was removed in 2004. Elise Labott, U.S. to Restore Relations with Libya, 
CNN (May 15, 2006, 8:30 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2006/US/05/15/libya/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/35EU-SDLP].  The State Department removed Cuba, an SST since 1982, in 
2015. See COUNTRY REPORTS 2019, supra note 33, at 183–84.  Iraq, on the list intermittently 
since 1979, was removed in 2004. See Donna Miles, U.S. Removes Iraq from List of State 
Sponsors of Terrorism, U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE (Oct. 22, 2004), https://archive.defense.gov/ 
news/newsarticle.aspx?id=25006 [https://perma.cc/SV5F-PJXZ].  The Department of State 
most recently rescinded Sudan’s designation as an SST on December 14, 2020, reflecting the 
country’s years of efforts countering terrorist groups and preventing terrorist expansion. See 
 
1288 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90 
B.  Regulating Interactions with SSTs Through Disclosure 
As evidenced above in the designation explanations,50 SSTs represent a 
global threat.  As such, federal securities laws provide multiple mechanisms 
for regulating interactions with these countries.  Companies that are subject 
to the SEC’s disclosure requirements, known as “reporting companies,”51 are 
those that:  (1) sell securities on U.S. exchanges, (2) engage in interstate 
commerce with 500 or more shareholders and $10,000,000 or more in assets, 
or (3) have engaged in registered public offerings.52  Companies falling into 
these categories are required to periodically file disclosures.53 
Disclosure of SST-related activities is regulated through multiple methods.  
This Note examines four principal mechanisms in this disclosure-based 
regime, working from the least onerous to most onerous standard, in the sense 
of how exacting each standard is to the companies it obligates.54  The 
discussion begins in Part I.B.1 with a review of the traditional materiality 
standard to the extent that the materiality standard requires SST disclosure.  
Part I.B.2 then considers the slightly more specific disclosure requirements 
under Regulation S-K.  Part I.B.3 discusses the heightened, specific 
disclosure requirements that the SEC solicits via comment letters.  Finally, 
Part I.B.4 discusses disclosure requirements pertaining to Iranian-related 
activities, which are specifically mandated by legislation and require the 
most extensive degree of disclosure. 
 
Michael R. Pompeo, Sudan’s State Sponsor of Terrorism Designation Rescinded, U.S. DEP’T 
OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/sudans-state-sponsor-of-terrorism-designation-rescinded/ 
[https://perma.cc/VA3C-M8D3] (last visited Oct. 29, 2021); see also COUNTRY REPORTS 
2016, supra note 21, at 305.  Sudan had been included on the list since 1993 for its part in 
harboring Osama bin Laden and for its support of militant Palestinian organizations. See Max 
Bearak & Naba Mohieddin, U.S. Lifts Sudan’s Designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, 
WASH. POST (Dec. 14, 2020, 9:15 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/sudan-
remove-state-terror-list/2020/12/14/7f119482-3d10-11eb-aad9-8959227280c4_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/UU4U-6F5Y]. 
 50. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 51. See Amy Deen Westbrook, What’s in Your Portfolio?:  U.S. Investors Are 
Unknowingly Financing State Sponsors of Terrorism, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 1151, 1182 (2010) 
[hereinafter Westbrook, What’s in Your Portfolio?]. 
 52. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2012); see also Westbrook, What’s in Your Portfolio?, supra 
note 51, at 1182. 
 53. See Westbrook, What’s in Your Portfolio?, supra note 51, at 1182. 
 54. Importantly, this Note only examines SST regulation through a disclosure lens, 
although federal securities regulation is certainly not the only way in which SSTs face 
regulation.  When the secretary of state determines that a country has repeatedly provided 
support for acts of international terrorism, disclosure requirements are triggered; however, the 
U.S. government may also impose sanctions on that country. See Bureau of Counterterrorism, 
supra note 12.  While sanctions are a mechanism of regulation worth mentioning due to their 
importance in discussions of SST regulation, they will not be addressed further in the Note.  
The remainder of this Note focuses solely on disclosure related to SSTs under the four 
principal mechanisms raised in Part I.B. 
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1.  The Mandates of the Materiality Standard 
In U.S. securities laws, whether companies must disclose certain business 
activities depends on whether those business activities are considered 
“material.”55  Two prominent U.S. Supreme Court cases guide the materiality 
standard.56  In TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.,57 the Court held that 
information is material if there is a “substantial likelihood that the 
disclosure . . . would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having 
significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.”58  
Similarly, in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson,59 the Court held that the materiality of 
information depends on a balancing of the probability of the event’s 
occurrence and the magnitude of the event, given the totality of activities.60  
The SEC interprets these holdings collectively, explaining that “the Supreme 
Court has determined information to be material if there is a substantial 
likelihood that a reasonable investor would consider the information 
important in making an investment decision or if the information would 
significantly alter the total mix of available information.”61 
The materiality standard in the context of SST disclosure is “the same 
materiality standard applicable to all other corporate activities.”62  Disclosure 
requirements under the materiality standard depend on what information is 
meaningful to a reasonable investor.63  Considering this framework in the 
context of SSTs, “[i]f combating terrorism is a priority . . . , then it may be 
material to potential U.S. investors that the money they pay for shares in a 
company may be used to fund operations in a country that sponsors 
terrorism.”64  In determining which interactions should be disclosed in the 
SST setting, companies generally consider the materiality of their contacts 
with countries identified as SSTs.65  Particularly when a company’s business 
activities with SSTs constitute a substantial financial portion of its business, 
disclosure is likely required.66 
 
 55. Westbrook, What’s in Your Portfolio?, supra note 51, at 1153. 
 56. See id. at 1186. 
 57. 426 U.S. 438 (1976). 
 58. Id. at 449. 
 59. 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
 60. Id. at 238. 
 61. Concept Release on Mechanism to Access Disclosures Relating to Business Activities 
in or with Countries Designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism, 72 Fed. Reg. 65,862, 65,863 
(Nov. 23, 2007) [hereinafter Concept Release on Mechanisms to Access Disclosures]; see also 
Memorandum from Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, SEC Disclosure of Business Related to State 
Sponsors of Terrorism (Dec. 7, 2007), https://www.sullcrom.com/publication_detail_1180 
[https://perma.cc/97RF-CXQT]. 
 62. Concept Release on Mechanisms to Access Disclosures, supra note 61, at 65,863. 
 63. See TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449. 
 64. Westbrook, What’s in Your Portfolio?, supra note 51, at 1188. 
 65. See Memorandum from Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, supra note 12. 
 66. See Westbrook, What’s in Your Portfolio?, supra note 51, at 1153. 
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SST disclosure requirements mandated by the materiality standard are 
therefore fairly general67 because federal securities laws do not impose any 
specific requirements to disclose business activities in or with SSTs.68  On 
its face, this standard is not particularly exacting, as it gives companies 
discretion to make general materiality determinations regarding business in 
or with SSTs and to disclose such information in the periodic reports they 
file with the SEC.69  For this reason, this Note presents this standard as the 
least onerous of the SST disclosure mechanisms.  Determinations of 
materiality are more challenging when a company’s operations relating to 
SSTs are “economically slight” compared to the size of the company, as the 
meaningfulness of a business activity is ultimately about more than just 
money.70  For example, “[i]t is likely that a U.S. investor would want to know 
if the company in which his retirement savings are invested is helping Iran’s 
nuclear program or electoral repression.”71  Although investors might care 
about money, they might also have concerns regarding threats to national 
security, making a given disclosure that is financially slight still material.72 
Overall, the materiality standard is not particularly onerous because it 
grants deference to corporations to determine what must be disclosed.  The 
slightly more exacting standards under Regulation S-K and other catchall 
provisions solicit SST disclosures with a higher degree of specificity. 
2.  Requirements of Regulation S-K 
The SEC resolved some of the murkiness of the materiality standard by 
implementing more specific disclosure requirements elsewhere, expressly 
delineating items that companies must disclose.  Between the various 
 
 67. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement by Securities and Exchange 
Commission Chairman Christopher Cox Concerning Companies’ Activities in Countries 
Known to Sponsor Terrorism (July 20, 2007), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-
138.htm [https://perma.cc/EL3F-E39M]. 
 68. Memorandum from Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, supra note 61; see also Concept 
Release on Mechanisms to Access Disclosures, supra note 61, at 65,863. 
 69. Generally, investors access disclosures in periodic reports companies file through 
EDGAR (the “Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval” database), the system used 
by companies submitting documents in connection with SEC disclosure requirements. About 
EDGAR, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/edgar/about [https://perma.cc/ 
2VG6-V3RH] (last visited Oct. 29, 2021).  However, in the past, the SEC has piloted other 
methods of delivering material SST disclosures to investors—namely, the SEC web tool. See 
Press Release, supra note 67.  The tool, which was only in place from June 25, 2007, to July 
20, 2007, permitted investors to obtain a list of companies doing business in or with SSTs. See 
Floyd Norris, S.E.C. Rethinks Lists Linking Companies and Terrorist States, N.Y. TIMES  
(July 21, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/21/business/21sec.html [https://perma.cc/ 
Q2BB-UFDK]; see also Banks, Lawmakers Oppose SEC’s Disclosure Tool Linking Public 
Companies to Terrorist Nations, MONEY MANAGER’S COMPLIANCE GUIDE NEWSL., Sept. 
2007, at 8.  Companies mentioning an SST in their recent annual reports were incorporated 
into the results of the web tool. See Press Release, supra note 67.  The tool represents one way 
in which the SEC has handled materiality disclosures previously. 
 70. See Westbrook, What’s in Your Portfolio?, supra note 51, at 1180. 
 71. Id. at 1219. 
 72. See id. at 1219–20. 
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provisions of Regulation S-K and Rule 12b-20 of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act Rule 12b-20”), SEC-regulated companies are 
governed by additional disclosure requirements that mandate more 
information than the materiality requirement discussed above. 
Regulation S-K provides more specific disclosure mandates via line-item 
requirements.73  Under Regulation S-K, the SEC requires disclosure of 
information about a company’s business, securities, financial data, 
management, and other information, whether or not the information is 
thought to be important to investors.74  Further, Regulation S-K requires 
companies to disclose specified categories of information in the nonfinancial 
portions of their periodic reports.75 
Item 101 requires disclosure regarding the general development of the 
business, a narrative description of the business, and other categories, 
including information pertaining to securities, financial data, and 
management.76  Item 101 specifically instructs companies to disclose 
information about where a company does business, the principal markets for 
the company’s products, the source of the raw products, and any risks 
attendant to the business’s foreign operations.77  Any one of these categories 
might implicate SST information, for instance, if raw products derive from 
an SST or if business with an SST constitutes a risk factor.78  Item 103 
requires disclosure of any material impending legal proceedings, including 
proceedings known to be contemplated by government authorities.79  Item 
303 also requires a discussion from management’s perspective of known 
trends or events that might materially affect the company’s liquidity or 
resources.80  SST disclosure is required here if business with SSTs affects a 
company’s legal stability or its liquidity and resources.  Item 503(c) 
“center[s] around behavior that is inherently risky,” which in turn might 
require disclosure of operations in SSTs if a company’s interactions with 
SSTs create risk for the company.81 
Other catchall regulations compel disclosure of activities related to SSTs, 
as well.  Exchange Act Rule 12b-20 requires that companies make statements 
 
 73. See Amy Deen Westbrook, Sunlight on Iran:  How Reductive Standards of Materiality 
Excuse Incomplete Disclosure Under the Securities Laws, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 13, 21 (2011) 
[hereinafter Westbrook, Sunlight on Iran]. 
 74. Westbrook, What’s in Your Portfolio?, supra note 51, at 1183. 
 75. See Westbrook, Sunlight on Iran, supra note 73, at 22. 
 76. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(a), (c) (2021); see also Westbrook, What’s in Your 
Portfolio?, supra note 51, at 1184–85; Westbrook, Sunlight on Iran, supra note 73, at 21. 
 77. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(1); see also Westbrook, Sunlight on Iran, supra note 73, 
at 21–22. 
 78. See Westbrook, Sunlight on Iran, supra note 73, at 21–22. 
 79. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.103; see also Westbrook, Sunlight on Iran, supra note 73, at 22. 
 80. See Exchange Act Release No. 6211, 52 Fed. Reg. 13,715, 13,717 (Apr. 26, 1987); 
see also Westbrook, Sunlight on Iran, supra note 73, at 22. 
 81. Westbrook, Sunlight on Iran, supra note 73, at 22–23. 
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that disclose any material information without being misleading.82  This 
sweeping standard parallels the inclusive nature of the materiality standard 
as applied to SST activity at large—as the SEC has expressed, stating that 
“[a]ny such material information not covered by a specific rule or regulation 
must be disclosed if necessary to make the required statements, in the light 
of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading.”83 
The requirements of Regulation S-K and Exchange Act Rule 12b-20, like 
the materiality standard discussed above, do not mandate disclosure 
specifically for activities in or with SSTs.  The provisions described here 
introduce a slightly more onerous task for reporting companies, requiring 
disclosure of specifically delineated categories with a higher degree of 
specificity.  In the larger scheme of mechanisms designed to induce SST 
disclosures, however, these standards are still fairly nonexacting and afford 
companies discretion in interpreting their applicability. 
3.  Disclosure by Means of Comment Letter84 
In addition to SST disclosures required under the materiality standard and 
those specifically solicited under other provisions, SST disclosures are 
compelled by a third mechanism:  comment letters.85  As a general practice, 
in line with the SEC’s core mission, the Division of Corporation Finance 
(DCF) regularly reviews filings for disclosures that appear to be deficient or 
to conflict with SEC regulations.86  The DCF then issues comment letters, 
leading to correspondence between the SEC and companies.87  These 
comment letters serve multiple purposes, as the DCF uses them to request 
clarification, to ask for revisions or updates to financial reports, and more 
generally, to deter fraud and increase investors’ ability to access certain 
information.88  Moreover, this form of oversight is a common practice for the 
SEC in gaining information regarding SST-related activities:  as of 2018, 12 
 
 82. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b–20; see also Westbrook, What’s in Your Portfolio?, supra 
note 51, at 1185. 
 83. Concept Release on Mechanisms to Access Disclosures, supra note 61, at 863. 
 84. As a technical matter, although some scholars writing on the topic regularly refer to 
these comment letter responses as “SST disclosures,” one source noted that these 
correspondences do not really constitute disclosure. See Westbrook, What’s in Your 
Portfolio?, supra note 51, at 1215–16.  This is because the SEC does not uniformly issue 
comment letters, and responses lack consistency and vary in length and detail, rendering 
comparison difficult. Id.  Nevertheless, there is a standard format to these inquires:  letters 
identify a periodic disclosure in question, ask a substantive question, and ask a company to 
evaluate the materiality of its operations with an SST. Id. at 1212.  Thus, for the purposes of 
this Note, because these sources regularly “disclose” information regarding interactions with 
SSTs and have some consistent elements with one another, these communications will be 
considered alongside other disclosure-generating mechanisms. 
 85. See Hills et al., Does State Sponsor of Terrorism Disclosure Limit SEC Financial 
Reporting Oversight?, supra note 6. 
 86. See Hills et al., State Sponsors of Terrorism Disclosure, supra note 5, at 6. 
 87. Id. at 6–7. 
 88. Hills et al., Does State Sponsor of Terrorism Disclosure Limit SEC Financial 
Reporting Oversight?, supra note 6. 
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percent of comment letters issued by the SEC pertained to SST disclosures.89  
However, the origin of the comment letter process as it relates to SST 
disclosure is slightly more complex. 
The SEC’s Office of Global Security Risk (OGSR) was created as a 
subdivision of the DCF, at the direction of Congress in 2003, to monitor 
whether companies’ filings include disclosure of material information 
regarding global security risk-related issues.90  The House Committee report 
that instructed the SEC to establish the OGSR expressed the concern that 
American investors “may be unwittingly investing in companies with ties to 
countries that sponsor terrorism and countries linked to human rights 
violations.”91  The report further posited that “a company’s association with 
sponsors of terrorism and human rights abuses, no matter how large or small, 
can have a material adverse effect on a public company’s operations, 
financial condition, earnings, and stock prices, all of which can negatively 
affect the value of an investment.”92 
With an understanding that existing disclosure mechanisms failed to 
capture some of this information, the legislature established the OGSR to 
review reports filed by reporting companies to determine whether such 
companies must disclose additional information about global security risk 
issues.93  Because the SEC does not mandate specific line-item requirements 
on companies’ interactions with SSTs, the OGSR’s duties specifically 
include both identifying companies that operate in designated SSTs and 
ensuring that such companies disclose that information to investors.94  The 
OGSR is critical in the realm of soliciting SST disclosures.95  After 
identifying relevant instances of SST interaction, the OGSR further 
contributes to the comment letter process, providing support to the DCF in 
enhancing reporting compliance via SST disclosures.96 
The DCF comment letters arise in two different fashions.97  In some 
instances, the SEC addresses a firm’s preexisting disclosures from within 
their prior financial reports, responding with follow-up questions regarding 
SST-related information.98  This is the most common method by which 
 
 89. Id. 
 90. See Hills et al., State Sponsors of Terrorism Disclosure, supra note 5, at 8. 
 91. H.R. REP. NO. 108-221, at 151 (2003). 
 92. Id. 
 93. See David M. Lynn, The Dodd-Frank Act’s Specialized Corporate Disclosure:  Using 
the Securities Laws to Address Public Policy Issues, 6 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 327, 350 (2011). 
 94. See id. at 350–51. 
 95. See generally Memorandum from Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, New Law Requires 




 96. Hills et al., State Sponsors of Terrorism Disclosure, supra note 5, at 8. 
 97. See Hills et al., Does State Sponsor of Terrorism Disclosure Limit SEC Financial 
Reporting Oversight?, supra note 6. 
 98. Id.  For example, in 2012, the SEC issued a comment letter to Logitech International:  
“We also note the disclosure on page 5 and elsewhere in your form 10-K that you operate in 
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comment letters are generated, given that existing disclosures are referenced 
in 80.5 percent of SST comment letters.99  In other situations, the DCF issues 
comment letters independently from financial report disclosures, responding 
instead to information from other sources.100  In these instances, comment 
letters reference an external outlet of information spurring the inquiry; for 
example, 26.8 percent of SST comment letters referenced a report from the 
media.101  Although the DCF letters were historically nonpublic, the SEC 
began posting inquiries and responses on the Electronic Data Gathering, 
Analysis, and Retrieval System (EDGAR) after pushback from both 
investors and Congress demanding greater transparency.102  Now, a great 
deal (but not all) of correspondence is publicly available.103 
These filings reveal that disclosure by means of comment letter creates a 
heightened standard of disclosure related to SSTs in the sense that the SEC 
requests more particularized information from companies as compared to the 
materiality standard that grants companies deference in determining what 
information matters for disclosure.  While comment letters as a mechanism 
are not necessarily more onerous (in that their requests might be simple or 
straightforward), comment letters require disclosure of information to a 
higher degree of specificity—information not initially released in accordance 
with the materiality standard. 
4.  The ITRA and Iran-Related Disclosure Mandates 
Unlike the broad discretionary securities disclosure laws, disclosure of 
Iran-related activities is specifically mandated.  On August 10, 2012, 
President Barack Obama signed the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human 
Rights Act of 2012 (ITRA).104  The ITRA augmented preexisting Iran-related 
 
regions including the Middle East and Africa.  As you know, Iran, Syria, and Sudan, countries 
located in those regions, are designated by the U.S. Department of State as state sponsors of 
terrorism . . . .  Your Form 10-K does not include disclosure about contacts with those 
countries.” Id. (quoting Comment Letter from Div. of Corp. Fin., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 
to Celia Blye & Jennifer Hardy, Logitech International S.A. (May 30, 2012), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1032975/000119312513018890/filename1.htm 
[https://perma.cc/2F7D-8MY5]). 
 99. Hills et al., State Sponsors of Terrorism Disclosure, supra note 5, at 11. 
 100. Hills et al., Does State Sponsor of Terrorism Disclosure Limit SEC Financial 
Reporting Oversight?, supra note 6; see, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 2–3 (discussing 
the press coverage of Barbies in Iran). 
 101. Hills et al., State Sponsors of Terrorism Disclosure, supra note 5, at 12. 
 102. See Westbrook, What’s in Your Portfolio?, supra note 51, at 1215; infra  
Parts II.A.1–2 (discussing arguments in favor of SST disclosure due to the need for 
transparency and investor demand). 
 103. Westbrook, What’s in Your Portfolio?, supra note 51, at 1215. 
 104. See Pub. L. No. 112-158, 126 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
the U.S.C.); see also Memorandum from Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Exchange Act Requires 
Issuers to Disclose Iran-Related Activities:  Disclosures Required in Reports Due to Be Filed 
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regulations, such as the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996105 and the Comprehensive 
Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010.106  Further, the 
ITRA created new sanctions specifically for human rights abuses in Iran and 
Syria.107 
Most importantly for the scope of this Note, § 219(b) of the ITRA imposed 
new reporting requirements on the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,108 
amending § 13 of the Act by requiring reporting companies to disclose any 
information relating to their assistance in transferring goods or technologies 
or providing services that are likely to be used by the Iranian government to 
commit human rights abuses.109  The ITRA further mandated that public 
companies include explanatory disclosures in their periodic reports if they 
engaged in other specific transactions or activities with Iran.110 
The disclosure requirements under the ITRA are significantly more 
onerous than other SST disclosure requirements.  Reporting companies that 
have “knowingly engaged” in such activities must include pertinent 
disclosures in their quarterly or annual filings.111  Section 219 further 
requires that companies concurrently make an “IRANNOTICE filing” with 
the SEC.112  Importantly, and in contrast to the materiality standard described 
above, there is no de minimis exception to the disclosure requirements under 
§ 219.113  In other words, there is no materiality threshold for triggering 
mandatory reporting under § 219 of the ITRA.114  In addition, the ITRA 
requires that the SEC deliver a report with responsive disclosures to the 
president.115  Because the disclosure requirements are imposed by the ITRA, 
the SEC maintains no discretion to decline solicitation of Iran-related 
disclosure requirements,116 and the president must investigate the activities 
disclosed in the filings and determine whether to impose sanctions on 
companies for engaging in violative activities.117 
 
 105. 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note. 
 106. Pub. L. No. 11-195, 124 Stat. 1312 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the 
U.S.C.); Memorandum from Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, supra note 104. 
 107. Id.  But see supra note 54 (limiting the scope of this Note to disclosure rather than 
considering the implications of sanctions). 
 108. See Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations:  Exchange Act Sections, U.S. SEC. & 
EXCH. COMM’N (Dec. 4, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/ 
exchangeactsections-interps.htm [https://perma.cc/8UYV-SXA5]. 
 109. See Park, supra note 8, at 108; see also Noam Noked, SEC Requirements Under the 
Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE 
(Sept. 10, 2012), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/09/10/sec-requirements-under-the-
iran-threat-reduction-and-syria-human-rights-act/ [https://perma.cc/3V7P-6DRX]. 
 110. See Memorandum from Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, supra note 104. 
 111. See Park, supra note 8, at 108–09. 
 112. See id. at 122–23; Memorandum from Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, supra note 12. 
 113. See Park, supra note 8, at 109. 
 114. See id. at 111. 
 115. See Memorandum Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, supra note 12; see also 
Memorandum from Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, supra note 104. 
 116. See Memorandum from Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, supra note 95. 
 117. See Memorandum from Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, supra note 12; Memorandum 
from Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, supra note 104. 
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Overall, the ITRA is arguably the most thorough and onerous of all the 
disclosure mechanisms.  It expanded existing regulation to solicit mandatory 
disclosure from companies that had not been specifically mandated, requiring 
companies to disclose almost all interactions with Iran.118  The ITRA 
requirements distinguish themselves from the requirements of the materiality 
standard and Regulation S-K because the ITRA creates specific disclosure 
requirements, pertaining to business with SSTs, not seen in the 
aforementioned mechanisms.119  The ITRA disclosure requirements also 
differ from the comment letter approach, as the ITRA takes a more 
comprehensive, prescriptive approach, as compared to the more reactive 
comment letter approach.120  While the comment letters issued by the SEC 
function more responsively, either as a reaction to company’s filings or 
information found on a company’s website or in media reports, the disclosure 
requirements of the ITRA are imposed by the Act itself and do not require 
the SEC to take affirmative action to obtain information.121 
Considering the ITRA alongside the framework of the other disclosure 
mechanisms, the SEC requires companies to make a variety of SST-related 
disclosures.  Companies must disclose:  information about their interactions 
with SSTs if those interactions are material,122 information falling under 
specific items in Regulation S-K,123 information (material or not) requested 
by the SEC in comment letters,124 and information about all interactions with 
Iran.125 
II.  THE DISCLOSURE DEBATE:  THE ABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF 
EXISTING SST DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS 
Part I.B articulated the SEC’s four principal disclosure mechanisms for 
soliciting information pertaining to SSTs:  (1) the materiality standard, (2) 
the provisions of Regulation S-K, (3) inquiry by comment letter, and (4) the 
requirements of the ITRA.  Part II of this Note analyzes these practices and 
considers whether the SEC’s current framework regarding SST disclosure 
functions altogether as a worthwhile, effective system for regulating 
interactions with countries designated as SSTs. 
Part II.A considers the benefits that SST disclosures provide.  Part II.B. 
turns to the critiques of the current system.  Lastly, Part II.C considers a 
perspective that falls between these two poles—the idea that SST disclosure 
is inherently a beneficial practice but that issues with the present mechanisms 
used to solicit such disclosures hamper the benefits. 
 
 118. Memorandum from Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, supra note 95. 
 119. See supra Parts I.B.1–2. 
 120. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 121. See Memorandum from Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, supra note 95. 
 122. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 123. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 124. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 125. See supra Part I.B.4. 
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A.  Benefits of SST Disclosure 
Many individuals and entities favor SST disclosure requirements.  
Statements from the SEC, the legislature, politicians, and particularly 
investors, reflect this attitude.  This section navigates the primary arguments 
in favor of SST disclosure.  Part II.A.1 considers disclosure as a means of 
ensuring transparency, Part II.A.2 examines how such disclosure fulfills 
investor demand, and Part II.A.3 explores how SST disclosure is used to 
achieve more socially beneficial practices. 
1.  Creating Transparency Through Information 
The first and perhaps most obvious benefit of SST disclosure requirements 
is that these requirements produce more information, leading to transparency 
regarding SSTs.  The SEC articulated why mandating SST disclosure is 
desirable from an information-forcing perspective.126  Speaking specifically 
of SSTs, former SEC Chairman Christopher Cox stated:  “Our role is to make 
that information readily accessible to the investing public, and we will 
continue to work to find better ways to accomplish that objective.”127  SST 
disclosures are therefore praised for their ability to make information more 
readily available. 
Further, this argument arises within the context of U.S. securities laws, 
which, like all disclosure-based regimes, view transparency as a desirable 
aim.128  Disclosure-based regimes “operate[] on the assumption that better 
information . . . will help buyers and sellers of securities make better 
judgments” and, in doing so, lead to more accurate prices.129  Requiring SST 
disclosure aids this process. 
Thus, transparency, though a desirable goal in and of itself, is also a means 
to more desirable ends.  Indeed, one of the fundamental “organizing 
principles” of securities laws in the United States holds that mandatory 
disclosure of information enables more efficient capital markets, which 
benefits all investors.130  Accurate, transparent disclosure methods enable 
increased stock price accuracy.131  Disclosure requirements overall (and SST 
 
 126. See Press Release, supra note 67. 
 127. Id.  Voices advocating for the investing public have similarly called on the SEC to 
create transparency around SSTs. See, e.g., Comment Letter from Thomas P. DiNapoli, N.Y. 
State Comptroller, to Christopher Cox, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 1 (Jan. 22, 
2008), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-27-07/s72707-23.pdf [https://perma.cc/JNV5-
ZV4W] (“I strongly support the SEC’s efforts to increase transparency and access to 
information about companies’ activities in countries designated by the United States 
Department of State as Sponsors of Terrorism . . . .”). 
 128. See generally Press Release, supra note 67. 
 129. Westbrook, Sunlight on Iran, supra note 73, at 72. 
 130. See Ferrell, supra note 7, at 213–14. 
 131. See id. at 216. 
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disclosure practices under this greater umbrella) can be economically 
beneficial in facilitating more efficient capital markets.132 
The desirability of transparency surrounding SSTs has also been echoed in 
the political sphere.  Former Senator Christopher J. Dodd of Connecticut 
called on the SEC to facilitate shareholders’ “access [to] reliable information 
regarding publicly traded companies’ business transactions involving Iran 
and Sudan.”133  The House Committee report that instructed the SEC to 
establish the OGSR similarly argued for the importance of transparency in 
SST disclosures because “a company’s association with [SSTs] . . . no matter 
how large or small, can have a material adverse effect on a public company’s 
operations, financial condition, earnings, and stock prices.”134  These 
consequences risk negatively impacting the value of an investment, and thus, 
transparency in providing such information is fundamentally important.135  
Investors, government officials, and guidance provided in the legal field have 
all expressed the importance of publicly disclosing information pertaining to 
business in or with SSTs.136  Thus, the notion that SST disclosure is 
beneficial and should be encouraged as a means of disseminating information 
to investors pervades various sectors. 
Further, transparency that serves to enhance the efficiency of the market 
leads to more beneficial results, as well.137  One perspective in favor of 
disclosure requirements argues that these requirements lead to improvements 
in the allocation of capital, as well as reduced costs arising from disparate 
interests of shareholders and stakeholders.138  Evidently, transparency is 
desirable not only as an inherently honest objective but also insofar as it 
serves as a means to achieving more efficient markets and more economically 
beneficial practices.  SST disclosure mechanisms are therefore desirable 
because of their ability to increase transparency in pursuit of these greater 
goals. 
2.  Fulfilling Existing Investor Demand 
As a general principle, investors expect to know what companies do and 
how their capital is being used.139  For investors to be adequately informed 
of companies’ interactions with SSTs, proponents of regulation argue that the 
SEC must mandate SST disclosure. 
 
 132. See Allen Ferrell, The Case for Mandatory Disclosure in Securities Regulation 
Around the World, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 81, 115–16 (2007). 
 133. Norris, supra note 69. 
 134. H.R. REP. NO. 108-221, at 151 (2003). 
 135. Id. (“[A] company’s association with sponsors of terrorism . . . can have a material 
adverse effect on a public company’s operations, financial condition, earnings, and stock 
prices . . . .”); see also Westbrook, What’s in Your Portfolio?, supra note 51, at 1196. 
 136. See Memorandum from Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, supra note 61; see also 
Westbrook, What’s in Your Portfolio?, supra note 51, at 1153–54. 
 137. See Ferrell, supra note 7, at 216. 
 138. See id. 
 139. See Westbrook, What’s in Your Portfolio?, supra note 51, at 1217. 
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The Center for Capital Market Competitiveness, a program of the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce, underscored this point in a comment letter to the 
SEC, recognizing first that “investors have an important interest in ensuring 
their funds do not support terrorism” and further that investors demand fair 
and equal access to information.140  Under this argument, the SEC should 
require SST disclosure to ensure that investor interests are adequately 
addressed.  The New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli similarly 
echoed, “It is vital for investors . . . to have access to accurate, timely and 
complete information on companies’ connections to [SSTs] in order to assess 
the risks posed fully.”141  These sources express the widely held desire from 
the investing public to have access to information regarding SSTs.142  
Further, the SEC has even noted the exceptional degree of demonstrated 
public interest in accessing this information.143 
Therefore, beyond ensuring that information regarding SSTs is 
transparent, proponents of SST disclosure contend that the disclosure is 
desirable because it functions to fulfill investor demand.  Ample evidence 
suggests that SST disclosures are indeed important to investors and that, in 
requiring these disclosures, the SEC fulfills investor demand. 
3.  Encouraging Socially Beneficial Practices 
Although the SEC traditionally regulates in the sphere of financial matters, 
SEC-promulgated mandates occasionally extend into other spheres.144  One 
such example of this is with SST disclosures.  Proponents of disclosure 
requirements that reach beyond financial information argue that broadening 
the scope of disclosure is desirable, as heightened requirements encourage 
 
 140. Comment Letter from Michael J. Ryan, Jr., Exec. Dir. and Senior Vice President, U.S. 
Chamber Ctr. for Cap. Mkts. Competitiveness, to Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n 1, 3 (Feb. 4, 2008), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-27-07/s72707-28.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N3H9-H36V]. 
 141. Comment Letter from Thomas P. DiNapoli to Christopher Cox, supra note 127, at 1; 
see also Comment Letter from Robert “Kinney” Poynter, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Ass’n of State 
Auditors, Controllers and State Treasurers, et al., to Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n 1 (Jan. 22, 2008), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-27-07/s72707-22.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4XA4-EUQU] (explaining that because investors have an interest in 
ensuring they are not acting contrary to foreign policy and humanitarian goals, investors seek 
“the assistance of the SEC . . . in identifying those corporations that, by virtue of their business 
or business ties in terrorist sponsoring countries, are acting contrary to U.S. foreign policy and 
humanitarian interests”). 
 142. See supra notes 139–41. 
 143. See Press Release, supra note 67.  Perhaps the most prominent evidence of investor 
demand for SST information occurred with the release of the SEC web tool. See generally 
supra note 69.  The SEC released a statement detailing this demand:  “Since the SEC added 
to our Internet site a web tool that permits investors to obtain information directly from 
company disclosure documents about their business interests in countries [designated as 
SSTs], the site has experienced exceptional traffic.” Press Release, supra note 67.  In the three 
weeks the web tool was live, visitors to the site “hit” the material well over 150,000 times. Id. 
 144. See Hills et al., Does State Sponsor of Terrorism Disclosure Limit SEC Financial 
Reporting Oversight?, supra note 6; see also infra Part II.B.1. 
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socially beneficial behavior.145  This is largely because disclosure invites 
increased public scrutiny that pressures companies to improve their 
underlying practices.146  SST disclosure is part of “a more general push to 
expand disclosure regulation to encourage social change,”147 furthering the 
efforts of national security policy through global business regulation.148 
Moreover, proponents of SST disclosure requirements argue that 
disclosure for social benefit is not a newfangled concept.  Although SEC 
disclosure requirements are based in materiality and the SEC is primarily 
concerned with financial oversight, public concern regarding noneconomic 
effects of business means that the SEC occasionally uses mandatory 
disclosure to advance social goals.149  Proponents of social disclosure 
requirements argue that the requirements advance noneconomic policy 
issues, ranging from the environment to human rights issues, by increasing 
overall transparency.150  The SEC has also historically used disclosure 
mechanisms to address a wide range of policy issues, such as climate change 
risks and sustainability concerns.151  As another example, the “Specialized 
Corporate Disclosure” provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act152 require disclosure relating to mine safety and 
conflict minerals.153  SST disclosures are, if anything, less novel than other 
disclosure requirements for social good:  SST disclosures remain largely 
 
 145. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Executive Pensions, 30 J. CORP. L. 
823, 854 (2005).  Some commentators even argue that the principal purpose of disclosure is 
not to achieve efficient capital markets, as discussed in Part II.A.1, but rather to reach better 
practices. Cf. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Stealth Compensation via Retirement 
Benefits, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 291, 320 (2004) (“The main aim of requiring disclosure of 
executive compensation is not to enable accurate pricing of the firm’s securities.  Rather, this 
disclosure is primarily intended to provide some check on arrangements that are too favorable 
to executives.”). 
 146. Cf. Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 145, at 854 (arguing that disclosure pertaining to 
executive compensation leads to enhanced transparency, exerting pressure on companies to 
adopt more acceptable practices); Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 145, at 320 (explaining that 
market forces, social dynamics, business press, and popular media exert pressure to adapt 
socially beneficial practices when undesirable disclosures are made and that directors, 
concerned about disapproval, comply). 
 147. Hills et al., Does State Sponsor of Terrorism Disclosure Limit SEC Financial 
Reporting Oversight?, supra note 6.  But see Mary Jo White, Former Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, Address at the 14th Annual A.A. Sommer, Jr. Corporate Securities and Financial 
Law Lecture:  The Importance of Independence, Fordham L. Sch. (Oct. 3, 2013), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch100113mjw [https://perma.cc/442D-ZSZK] (“[A]s the 
Chair of the SEC, I must question, as a policy matter, using the federal securities laws and the 
SEC’s powers of mandatory disclosure to accomplish these goals.”).  Part II.B.1 further 
elaborates on arguments against the SEC furthering policy goals. 
 148. See Westbrook, What’s in Your Portfolio?, supra note 51, at 1153. 
 149. See Park, supra note 8, at 89. 
 150. See id.; see also supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the benefits of transparency in a 
disclosure-based regime). 
 151. See Lynn, supra note 93, at 349–50; see also Westbrook, What’s in Your Portfolio?, 
supra note 51, at 1188. 
 152. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of the U.S.C.). 
 153. See Lynn, supra note 93, at 327–28. 
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rooted in notions of materiality and thus align with traditional regulation by 
the SEC.154 
Therefore, though the core mission of the SEC focuses on financial 
disclosure, the SEC occasionally modifies its approach, requiring broadened 
disclosures relating to conduct that is not strictly financial.155  Supporters of 
SST disclosure requirements argue that these requirements regulate SSTs in 
a similar manner, improving the practices of corporations, as the inherent 
pressure of outside scrutiny compels corporations to align their activities with 
more socially beneficial practices.156 
B.  The Perspectives Against SST Disclosure Requirements 
Despite the existence of SST disclosure requirements for several decades, 
critics still contend that they are ineffective and should not exist in their 
current form.  Part II.B.1 discusses the argument that the SEC is not the 
proper entity for the regulation of SSTs.  Part II.B.2 then examines the 
shortcomings of the materiality standard.  Part II.B.3 turns to the problematic 
stigmatization resulting from SST disclosure mechanisms. 
1.  The SEC as the Wrong Regulator 
The most sweeping argument against current SST disclosure requirements 
suggests that existing disclosure mechanisms are inappropriate because the 
SEC should not involve itself with such regulation.157  There are two strains 
of this argument.  The first finds that the SEC as an agency is an inappropriate 
regulator in this sphere.158  The second argument takes an externally focused 
approach:  rather than positioning the SEC as inherently wrong for the role, 
this argument suggests other entities are better suited for the task.159 
To begin, some critics argue against SEC-promulgated SST disclosure on 
the premise that the sphere of terrorism does not properly fall under the 
SEC’s domain.160  The SEC’s mission concerns itself with the regulation of 
financial reports, the deterrence of fraud, and the facilitation of investor 
 
 154. See id. at 350.  But see supra Part I.B.4 (discussing the absence of a de minimis 
threshold mandating disclosure under the ITRA). 
 155. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Making Sustainability Disclosure Sustainable, 107 GEO. L.J. 
923, 936–37 (2019). 
 156. See supra note 146. 
 157. See, e.g., Comment Letter from Diana L. Preston, Managing Dir. and Assoc. Gen. 
Counsel, and David G. Strongin, Managing Dir., Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, to Nancy M. 
Morris, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 1 (Jan. 22, 2008) [hereinafter SIFMA Letter], 
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-27-07/s72707-21.pdf [https://perma.cc/5DER-9JWX]; see 
also Hills et al., Does State Sponsor of Terrorism Disclosure Limit SEC Financial Reporting 
Oversight?, supra note 6. 
 158. See, e.g., SIFMA Letter, supra note 157; Hills et al., Does State Sponsor of Terrorism 
Disclosure Limit SEC Financial Reporting Oversight?, supra note 6. 
 159. See, e.g., SIFMA Letter, supra note 157, at 2. 
 160. See generally, e.g., Lynn, supra note 93; SIFMA Letter, supra note 157. 
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access to information; regulating SST disclosures is outside of its domain.161  
Critics claim that in focusing on a political or foreign policy agenda, the SEC 
acts inconsistently with its traditional role of overseeing the disclosure of 
material information.162 
The Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) 
expressed this viewpoint via a comment letter directed to the SEC.163  
SIFMA argued that the SEC’s mission is neither foreign policy nor national 
security matters and that, consequently, disclosure mandated by the SEC 
pertaining to SSTs is “inherently unrelated to the SEC’s primary mission” of 
administering and enforcing disclosure-based securities laws.164  A similar 
letter from the law firm Shearman & Sterling LLP echoed this sentiment, 
asserting that because the SEC is an independent government agency, it 
should not use its resources to solicit disclosure pertaining to SSTs beyond 
those compelled by the materiality standard, as any disclosure beyond 
materiality does not further the SEC’s mission of providing investors 
material information.165 
Further, a recent empirical study supports the notion that the SEC, in 
focusing its efforts on SST disclosure, compromises its ability to effectively 
regulate elsewhere.166  This study suggests that this pattern occurs in part 
because the SEC is subject to budget constraints, so shifting efforts toward 
SST regulation strains the limited resources that might otherwise go toward 
financial oversight.167  The study speculates that SST disclosure regulation 
crowds out financial reporting and increases the risk that accounting errors 
will be overlooked.168 
A final criticism of the SEC as a regulatory body in the SST space focuses 
more on institutional concerns.  When the SEC begins regulating in spheres 
with more ambiguous guidance, the argument follows that the SEC risks 
damaging the integrity of the materiality standard.169  One critique of 
 
 161. See Hills et al., Does State Sponsor of Terrorism Disclosure Limit SEC Financial 
Reporting Oversight?, supra note 6. 
 162. See Lynn, supra note 93, at 350; cf. Mary Jo White, supra note 147 (disagreeing with 
the policy that uses federal securities laws as a method for nonfinancial regulation). 
 163. See generally SIFMA Letter, supra note 157. 
 164. Id. at 1. 
 165. See Comment Letter from Abigail Arms, Cap. Mkts. Partner, Shearman & Sterling 
LLP, to Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 1 (Feb. 15, 2008), 
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-27-07/s72707-29.pdf [https://perma.cc/U6JJ-LVXN]. 
 166. See Hills et al., Does State Sponsor of Terrorism Disclosure Limit SEC Financial 
Reporting Oversight?, supra note 6; see also Comment Letter from Paul D. Glenn, Couns., 
Inv. Adviser Ass’n, to Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 2 (Jan. 22, 2008), 
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-27-07/s72707-25.pdf [https://perma.cc/8HG9-66TS] 
(arguing that “the SEC has limited resources that [are] diverted by [SST] initiative[s]”). 
 167. Hills et al., Does State Sponsor of Terrorism Disclosure Limit SEC Financial 
Reporting Oversight?, supra note 6. 
 168. Hills et al., State Sponsors of Terrorism Disclosure, supra note 5, at 1–3.  Interestingly, 
because similar effects for comment letters referencing non-SST risk factors were not 
observed, this issue is a unique result of SST regulation. Id. at 4. 
 169. See SIFMA Letter, supra note 157, at 3–4. 
 
2021] MURKY MATERIALITY & SCATTERED STANDARDS 1303 
SEC-regulated SST disclosure, therefore, argues for preserving the integrity 
of “the time-honored materiality standard on which our disclosure-based 
approach to securities registration has long been based.”170 
Parallel to the argument that the SEC is intrinsically an inappropriate 
regulator in this sphere is the notion that other entities are better suited for 
the task.  Critics of SST regulation argue that the SEC should defer to the 
Department of State, Department of Defense, Department of Commerce, and 
Department of Homeland Security or to the Office of Foreign Assets Control 
on matters of foreign policy.171  This argument is bolstered by the subject 
matter of SST disclosures:  the content necessarily deals with international 
policy and terrorism.  SIFMA expressed the viewpoint that foreign policy 
and national security matters should be left to other government agencies that 
might deal more appropriately in such subject matter because the SEC lacks 
the requisite expertise in this area where other bodies specialize.172 
Overall, general concerns persist regarding whether the SEC should be 
concerned with influencing social policy, whether such concerns ultimately 
take precedence over keeping investors informed, and whether such 
extraneous focus runs the risk of actually causing harm to the SEC’s other 
functionalities.173  Simply, critics argue that entities other than the SEC can 
more aptly handle this challenge. 
2.  Disclosure as an Ineffective Mechanism of SST Regulation 
Other criticisms of SST disclosure requirements, rather than denouncing 
the SEC as the wrong regulator, address issues inherent to the underlying 
mechanisms.  The principal argument against the effectiveness of SST 
disclosure is premised on the idea that the materiality standard, without 
further guidance from the SEC on how to apply it, is unsuccessful in 
soliciting disclosures from companies because of its lack of specificity.174  
One study analyzed the publicly available disclosures of over one hundred 
companies conducting business within SSTs.175  The study found that fewer 
than half of the companies made any disclosures of their activities in relation 
to the designated countries, and even those that did often withheld 
information regarding the nature of the business.176 
Some critics of current SST disclosure practices allege that the ambiguous 
applicability of the materiality standard undermines the SEC’s attempts at 
 
 170. Id. at 2. 
 171. See id.; see also Mary Jo White, supra note 147 (arguing in favor of the SEC 
maintaining its independence rather than bowing to outside forces).  White stressed the 
importance of the SEC standing strong against pressure to invoke its disclosure power to exert 
influence over companies to change behavior rather than merely to disclose financial 
information. Id. 
 172. See SIFMA Letter, supra note 157, at 2. 
 173. Fisch, supra note 155, at 939; see also supra note 166. 
 174. See Westbrook, What’s in Your Portfolio?, supra note 51, at 1218–19. 
 175. See id. at 1153–54. 
 176. Id. at 1154. 
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regulation, as companies assert that they need not disclose their interactions 
with SSTs if such activity is not a substantial part of their global 
operations.177  Indeed, reporting companies have expressed the belief that 
when their activities in or with SSTs are not “financially significant,” they 
are under no obligation to disclose the activities.178  The argument follows 
that disclosure of activities with SSTs is empirically inadequate, as 
companies subvert the standard when possible.179  Critics of SST disclosures 
contend that the underlying materiality standard is not taken seriously and, 
consequently, that SST disclosure is ineffective.180 
The materiality standard is not the only disclosure mechanism that faces 
critique as contributing to an ineffective system, however.  An additional 
argument against current requirements condemns the usefulness of comment 
letters in soliciting disclosures as having counterproductive effects.181  For 
example, inquiries from the DCF, meant to produce greater transparency, 
might encourage companies to provide less disclosure in the first place in an 
attempt to dodge SEC detection for minor issues.182  The initiative risks 
producing incomplete disclosure and inadvertently rewarding companies that 
reveal less information, in contravention of the SEC’s goals.183 
Critics thus fault the shortcomings of current SST disclosure mechanisms 
and, in particular, condemn the functionality of the materiality standard and 
comment letters because they implicate SST disclosures.  These theories 
ultimately support the argument that current SST disclosure practices are 
problematic, ineffective, and work against the SEC’s goals.184 
3.  Unfair Stigmatization of Companies 
The above discussion frames the materiality standard and comment letters 
as creating an ineffective framework of SST disclosure mechanisms.  
However, critics also assert that SST disclosures stigmatize companies that 
make such disclosures.185  Reporting companies subjected to disclosure 
requirements are inevitably connected to negative language—they are 
 
 177. See, e.g., id. at 1205; SIFMA Letter, supra note 157, at 2–3 (detailing instances in 
which corporations with stakes in companies with business activities in Sudan did not disclose 
this information because it was not material to the company).  But see Donald C. Langevoort, 
Disasters and Disclosures:  Securities Fraud Liability in the Shadow of a Corporate 
Catastrophe, 107 GEO. L.J. 967, 1013 (2019) (“[T]he supposedly clean separation between 
the financial and the non-financial is an illusion.  Even if we stick closely to financial 
materiality, there is ample research tying environmental, social, and similar aspects of 
corporate behavior to stock market valuations and firm profitability.”). 
 178. Westbrook, What’s in Your Portfolio?, supra note 51, at 1214. 
 179. See id. at 1153. 
 180. See, e.g., id. at 1218–19; see also SIFMA Letter, supra note 157, at 2–3. 
 181. See Banks, Lawmakers Oppose SEC’s Disclosure Tool Linking Public Companies to 
Terrorist Nations, supra note 69. 
 182. See SIFMA Letter, supra note 157, at 2. 
 183. See id. 
 184. See Westbrook, What’s in Your Portfolio?, supra note 51, at 1154. 
 185. See SIFMA Letter, supra note 157, at 2. 
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compelled to produce filings associating their business operations with 
terrorism, although they themselves are neither perpetrating nor supporting 
terrorism.186  These critiques do not simply assert that companies wish to 
hide their distasteful conduct from investors; rather, this argument presents 
the more nuanced notion that SST disclosures do not fairly reflect that the 
underlying business activities of the companies are legal.187  The European 
Commission, the executive branch of the European Union, observed this 
phenomenon, noting that SEC disclosure practices fail to differentiate 
companies’ interactions with SSTs that are legitimate and legal from those 
that are more nefarious.188  Thus, some worry that when authorized activities 
with SSTs are disclosed alongside unauthorized activities inconsistent with 
U.S. laws and policies, this muddling of information confuses investors and 
reduces the overall effectiveness of disclosures.189  Reporting companies, 
whose unsavory—though not illegal—disclosures are made available to the 
public, similarly argue against mandating such filings to protect their own 
reputations.190  As a result, companies object to making SST disclosures 
altogether because they fear alarming investors who wish to avoid investing 
in companies doing business with SSTs.191 
Critics argue, therefore, that mandating SST disclosure practices risks 
unfairly stigmatizing companies that disclose their activities.  These 
arguments further reveal that reporting companies may resist disclosing their 
business activities in or with SSTs unless they are obviously required to do 
so, either because their activities with SSTs are significant or because a 
particular piece of information is specifically solicited.192  The drawbacks to 
disclosure yet again encourage companies to behave in ways that undermine 
the very purpose of the disclosure requirements. 
 
 186. See id. 
 187. See, e.g., SIFMA Letter, supra note 157, at 2.  This is why the short-lived web tool, 
discussed in Part I.B.1, earned the nickname the “terrorism blacklist.” Banks, Lawmakers 
Oppose SEC’s Disclosure Tool Linking Public Companies to Terrorist Nations, supra note 
69.  Although, as noted in Part I.B.1, disclosures revealing that companies do not do business 
in particular SSTs were filtered out of the search, annual reports stating that a company had 
pulled investments out of the SST warranted inclusion in the web tool’s list. See Press Release, 
supra note 67. 
 188. See Comment Letter from David Wright, Deputy Gen. Dir., Eur. Comm’n, to Nancy 
M. Morris, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 2 (May 6, 2008), https://www.sec.gov/ 
comments/s7-27-07/s72707-30.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MWM-Z2YY]; see also Comment 
Letter from Judith A. Lee & James D. Slear, Couns. for W. Union, to Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y, 
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 3 (Jan. 22, 2008), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-27-
07/s72707-26.pdf [https://perma.cc/RB7G-23FA] (“[T]he current practice regarding 
disclosures of business activities in or with [SSTs] . . . makes no distinction between . . . 
legitimate business activities that have been specifically licensed by the U.S. Government . . . 
[and] activities that may be contrary to the interests of the United States or that contribute to 
terrorism.”). 
 189. See Comment Letter from Judith A. Lee & James D. Slear to Nancy M. Morris, supra 
note 188, at 4; supra notes 187–88. 
 190. See Press Release, supra note 67. 
 191. See Westbrook, What’s in Your Portfolio?, supra note 51, at 1221. 
 192. Id. at 1153. 
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C.  A Critical Approach Favoring SST Disclosures 
A third approach to analyzing SST disclosure mechanisms strikes a middle 
ground, recognizing the pitfalls of the current framework while maintaining 
that SST disclosures are beneficial and necessary.  Part II.C.1 discusses the 
benefits that could be achieved through SST disclosures, if only such 
disclosures were enhanced.  Part II.C.2 discusses the unavoidable costs of 
SST disclosure that will exist no matter how thorough or sparse disclosure 
requirements are.  Ultimately, this critical perspective contends that, 
generally, SST disclosure mechanisms are worthwhile but that the current 
framework requires revision in order to be more effective. 
1.  (Potential) Benefits of SST Disclosure:  What Might Be Possible Under 
a Reformed Framework 
This approach rests on the critique articulated in Part II.B.2:  in the absence 
of clear guidance from the SEC, the materiality standard is ineffective.193  
Rather than argue against existing SST disclosure as a whole, however, this 
critically optimistic perspective posits that information about a company’s 
operation in or with SSTs is nevertheless important to investors.194  Instead 
of disposing entirely of the current disclosure framework or arguing against 
SST disclosures as inappropriate or unfair, this approach encourages 
increased enforcement of SST disclosure by administering disclosure 
requirements more strictly.195 
The materiality standard is not the only problematic mechanism in 
soliciting SST disclosures, however.  To summarize Part I.B above, SST 
disclosure requirements are triggered by the materiality standard, the 
provisions of Regulation S-K, the cherry-picked inquiries of the DCF via 
comment letters, and further, via a departure from the materiality standard 
under the more exacting provisions of § 219 of the ITRA.  The critical 
perspective contends that although SST disclosures are desirable, this 
multifaceted current framework creates a “lack of operational utility,” 
undermining the effectiveness of disclosure efforts with vague, undefined 
terms that ultimately hamper the value of disclosed information.196 
One commentator proposed the adoption of a broad reading of the 
materiality standard that would implicate SST disclosures more clearly to 
clarify the inexactness of these standards.197  Legislative history supports this 
argument, as the House Committee report that established the OGSR 
similarly argued for transparency in SST disclosures under the premise that 
any business in or with SSTs, “no matter how large or small,” can materially 
 
 193. Id. at 1218–19; see also notes 174–84 and accompanying text. 
 194. See id. at 1218. 
 195. See id. 
 196. Park, supra note 8, at 93. 
 197. Westbrook, What’s in Your Portfolio?, supra note 51, at 1189. 
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affect a company’s operations and financial conditions and that, in turn, such 
information is material to investors.198 
This argument pushes for a shift in the materiality standard to 
automatically trigger disclosure of SST activities, arguing for a presumption 
of “materiality per se.”199  Indeed, the SEC even briefly considered adopting 
a blanket assumption of materiality in the realm of SSTs.200  In 2001, the 
SEC’s director of the Division of Corporation Finance stated, “We agree that 
a reasonable investor would likely consider it significant that a foreign 
company raising capital in the U.S. markets has business relationships with 
countries, governments or entities with which any U.S. company would be 
prohibited from dealing because of U.S. economic sanctions.”201  Later that 
same year, the SEC departed from that position, assuring investors that the 
SEC had no intention to require companies to make heightened disclosures 
about business related to SSTs, but the argument has survived elsewhere.202  
Proponents argue that without significantly amending current disclosure 
mechanisms, the SEC could simply clarify that information pertaining to 
business activities in or with SSTs is something reasonable investors care 
about.203 
A similar alternative to a materiality per se requirement would mandate 
that companies disclose their SST activities through stricter enforcement of 
the provisions of Regulation S-K.204  Further, this argument contends that 
Regulation S-K could be amended to include an explicit SST disclosure 
requirement, requiring that companies disclose their SST-related activities 
pursuant to the provisions of Regulation S-K.205  One benefit to this proposal 
is that it “would not be an onerous requirement—there are simply not that 
many countries that the United States designates as SSTs.”206  These 
possibilities together constitute a cautiously optimistic approach to SST 
disclosure, maintaining that such information is important for investors but 
offering various remedies to strengthen the effectiveness of the deficient 
existing framework. 
 
 198. H.R. REP. NO. 108-221, at 151 (2003); see also Westbrook, What’s in Your Portfolio?, 
supra note 51, at 1196. 
 199. See Westbrook, What’s in Your Portfolio?, supra note 51, at 1188, 1193–94. 
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Acting Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (May 8, 2001), in U.S.-CHINA SEC. REV. 
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 204. See Amy Deen Westbrook, The Inadequate Disclosure of Business Conducted in 
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2.  Costs of Disclosure:  An Inherent Downside of Any SST Disclosure 
Mechanism 
The one commonality between all mechanisms used to solicit disclosures 
from corporations is that subsequent disclosures can prove costly to the 
companies.  Any discussion of SST disclosure requirements is incomplete 
without a consideration of costs.  Because costs are virtually inevitable no 
matter the degree of disclosure required, as explained below, this “downside” 
is examined here, within the critical perspective of Part II.C, which ultimately 
concludes that SST disclosure requirements are worthwhile even given their 
drawbacks. 
Most commonly, disclosure creates costs through fraud-on-the-market 
litigation for the implied private right of action under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.207  When corporations address 
known risk factors in their public filings, including environmental, social, 
and human rights issues (or, as is pertinent here, interactions with SSTs), 
their statements risk creating the basis for claims of actionable deception, 
essentially opening companies to the possibility of litigation for their 
statements.208  Thus, as far as corporations are concerned, SST disclosures 
give rise to fraud liability for SST-related statements based on the accuracy 
of the information contained in such statements.  When corporations make 
any statements, even soft or immaterial ones, they create a risk of fraud 
claims for these statements that would not otherwise exist.209  These risks are 
heightened in instances when corporations disclose in response to increased 
investor interest—as is often the case with SST disclosures—or when the 
corporations’ statements are repeated over time.210  Any type of elevated SST 
disclosure requirement therefore risks liability for securities fraud claims, 
where, without the initial disclosure, there would be no such liability.211  
Disclosure thus necessarily implicates unintended costs for companies.212 
Although disclosure may give rise to additional costs because of the 
ensuing fraud liability, the alternate course of action—nondisclosure—does 
not necessarily eliminate costs imposed on companies.213  This is the flipside 
to the materiality requirements discussed above.  Omissions liability—the 
liability that arises from the failure to disclose material information—will 
prove costly in many circumstances, so that nondisclosure in the sphere of 
 
 207. See Langevoort, supra note 177, at 970, 980–81 (“A fraud-on-the-market lawsuit 
allows for recovery of damages on behalf of investors who bought or sold publicly traded 
securities in an efficient marketplace at a price distorted by fraud on the part of the issuer or 
its management.”). 
 208. See id. at 1014. 
 209. See id. 
 210. See id. 
 211. See id. at 980–81, 1014. 
 212. See id. at 1015. 
 213. See id. 
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questionable materiality is not an adequate method of avoiding costs 
either.214 
In addition, the costs associated with disclosure lead to the assumption that 
the threat of litigation causes less-than-optimal disclosure from companies, 
“fearing the consequences if they make statements or projections that turn 
out badly.”215  Corporations may be hesitant to make disclosures that might 
inflate expectations or generate future litigation.216 
Besides the costs associated with the risk of litigation created by disclosure 
requirements, there are a slew of other associated costs.217  Real costs include 
those associated with collecting information and weeding out that which is 
immaterial.218  Further, in instances of disclosure that is speculative, 
premature, or immaterial, such disclosure might lead to costly speculation 
and overreaction by investors to the detriment of the company.219 
Overall, the optimal level of disclosure is not always obvious—any level 
of compromise in either direction is a trade-off between the benefits inherent 
to disclosure and the costs associated with both the solicitation of disclosure 
and the resulting risk of fraud liability.  The discussion of disclosure costs 
does not represent a clear-cut argument for or against SST disclosure 
requirements.  Instead, cost consideration functions as a necessary drawback 
in considering securities disclosure requirements of any level. 
While Part II.A considered the benefits of SST disclosure requirements 
and Part II.B examined the drawbacks and criticisms, Part II.C here explores 
 
 214. See generally JAY B. SYKES, CONG. RSCH SERV., LSB10008, UPDATE:  WHEN SILENCE 
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where a statute or omission obliges a defendant to speak and, most applicably here, where an 
omission renders an affirmative statement misleading).  Further, for a plaintiff to state an 
adequate claim under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, a 
plaintiff must show that the defendant:  (1) made a material omission, (2) with scienter, (3) in 
connection with purchase or sale of securities, (4) that plaintiff relied on that omission, and 
(5) that the omission caused plaintiff economic loss. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78j; 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.10b-5 (2021)).  If such a showing can be made, nondisclosure may also prove costly to 
companies. 
 215. Langevoort, supra note 177, at 1013. 
 216. See id. at 980. 
 217. See id. at 975.  But see Ferrell, supra note 132, at 85 (explaining the traditional 
counterargument that “[i]n a world in which a firm has private information about the quality 
of its product and disclosure is costless, firms will voluntarily publicly disclose their private 
information as a signal of their products’ quality”); Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 145, at 
853 (noting that even if disclosure requirements imparted some real costs on companies, 
“[corporations] generally already have low-cost access to the information . . . [and] 
[u]ndoubtedly, firms can obtain this information at lower cost than can shareholders or 
researchers”). 
 218. See Langevoort, supra note 177, at 975.  But see Alex Edmans et al., The Real Costs 
of Disclosure, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Nov. 6, 2013), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/11/06/the-real-costs-of-disclosure/ 
[https://perma.cc/VZJ7-RH4S] (“[T]here may be costs of producing information.  However, 
firms already produce copious information for internal or tax purposes.”). 
 219. See Langevoort, supra note 177, at 975. 
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the more nuanced argument, weighing the inevitable implications of any 
imperfect standard, while ultimately concluding that the most prominent 
downside of the current framework is that it is too weak.  While this approach 
is undoubtedly critical of current SST disclosure requirements, it argues for 
the continuation and reinforcement of the existing framework rather than for 
abandoning such disclosure mechanisms altogether. 
III.  ESTABLISHING A UNIFORM STANDARD:  ENACTING AN SST-SPECIFIC 
REGULATION S-K PROVISION 
This Note proposes that the SEC add a more precise provision under 
Regulation S-K that mandates disclosure of all SST-related activities.220  The 
guiding premise of this resolution is that investors care about—and indeed 
demand—SST disclosures.221  This resolution accepts that transparency 
through SST disclosure is inherently beneficial in advancing compelling 
interests.222  However, current SST disclosure requirements need greater 
exactitude to be more effective.223  This proposal continues the existing 
benefits associated with SST disclosure addressed in Part II.A, while 
eliminating many of the issues raised in Part II.B.  Further, although this 
proposed solution does not resolve all underlying SST disclosure issues, such 
as the notion that SST disclosures should not be regulated by the SEC in the 
first place,224 it does remediate the somewhat ineffective nature of the current 
requirements.225 
Part III.A formulates the guidelines of a more effective proposal for 
standardizing SST disclosure requirements based on the overarching pitfalls 
of the current disjointed requirements.  Part III.B analyzes the strengths of a 
more uniform standard under Regulation S-K.  Part III.C considers the 
possible weaknesses inherent in this proposal. 
A.  Developing an Effective Regulation S-K Provision 
The critical issue plaguing SST disclosure standards in their current form 
is that there are so many different mechanisms used to solicit disclosures 
from corporations, and consequently, the utility of SST disclosure is difficult 
to assess.226  First, there is no clear standard for what SST activities must be 
disclosed.227  Second, there is no singular disclosure mechanism lending 
 
 220. See supra Part I.B.2 (discussing the existing requirements of Regulation S-K). 
 221. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 222. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 223. See supra Part II.C.1. 
 224. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 225. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 226. See supra Parts I.B.1–4 (discussing the materiality standard, specific provisions in 
Regulation S-K, targeted disclosure by means of comment letters, and the ITRA). 
 227. See supra Parts I.B.1–4 (discussing the varying disclosure requirements under each of 
the four mechanisms). 
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consistency to the disclosures that are solicited.228  Together, these issues 
muddy any existing clarity regarding SST disclosure requirements, leading 
to patchy disclosure standards that lack uniformity. 
The various channels and standards for disclosure mechanisms cause 
significant discrepancies in the resulting SST disclosures:  the traditional 
materiality standard requires corporations to disclose only information that 
would be considered important to reasonable investors,229 a standard that 
affords some deference to the interpretations of the corporations 
themselves.230  Regulation S-K takes a slightly more exacting approach, 
mandating particular (yet still notably broad) line-item disclosure 
requirements.231  The comment letter method solicits disclosures in a 
significantly different manner, with the DCF affirmatively requesting 
information on highly specific matters, without notable concern for 
materiality.232  Lastly, disclosures solicited via legislation under the ITRA 
differ from the aforementioned methods in that the legislation only applies to 
Iran but makes no exception for de minimis information, thus rejecting the 
materiality standard.233  The only thing that is clear is that the many standards 
require inconsistent information with different degrees of deference to 
corporations’ own determinations. 
There is understandable ambiguity regarding disclosures in this sphere:  
Are activities with SSTs inherently meaningful to investors and thus 
material?234 Or, do the various arguments by corporations—that certain 
SST-related activities are unimportant235 or that these disclosures, when 
compelled, unfairly “blacklist” corporations—defeat a presumption of 
materiality?236  These questions give rise to the second principal issue 
plaguing the effectiveness of current SST disclosures:  because there is no 
overarching governance between the various standards, these standards fail 
to produce a uniform set of disclosures.237  If a singular mechanism 
governing SST disclosure (for instance, if disclosure was only solicited via 
comment letters) existed, the authority governing the disclosure could 
quickly resolve these discrepancies (or more likely, discrepancies would not 
exist in the first place). 
 
 228. See supra Parts I.B.1–4 (explaining that there are four principle disclosure 
mechanisms in this space). 
 229. See supra notes 57–60 and accompanying text (defining the materiality standard that 
has evolved under judicial decisions and SEC interpretation). 
 230. See supra Part II.B.2 (explaining that many corporations determine their own 
interactions with SSTs to be immaterial). 
 231. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 232. See supra Part I.B.3; e.g., supra text accompanying notes 97–100. 
 233. See supra Part I.B.4. 
 234. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 134. 
 235. See supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
 236. See, e.g., supra note 187. 
 237. See supra Part II.C (discussing the potential for SST disclosures to be effective, if not 
for the current lack of clarity surrounding existing requirements). 
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Therefore, this Note proposes that Regulation S-K adopt a new item 
requiring disclosure of all of a corporation’s dealings with SSTs.  This 
proposal unifies the competing standards so that investors have access to 
clear, consolidated SST disclosures if investors choose to seek out this 
information.  Moreover, a Regulation S-K line-item requirement would 
ensure not only that the information is readily available but that all 
corporations are held to the same SST disclosure standard.  In this sense, the 
proposed Regulation S-K item incorporates the “no de minimis exception” 
aspect of the ITRA,238 requiring sweeping disclosure requirements in the 
SST sphere. 
B.  Primary Strengths of the Proposed Solution 
This Regulation S-K addition achieves multiple benefits in SST disclosure 
practices.  Part III.B.1 examines how the creation of a more specific 
requirement—overriding the deferential standard of materiality—eliminates 
confusion, increases exactitude, and leads to a more coherent set of SST 
disclosures from corporations.  Part III.B.2 explains how this Regulation S-K 
requirement would effectively carry on, and in certain instances advance, the 
current benefits arising from SST disclosure practices. 
1.  Avoiding Conflicting Interpretations of Materiality 
This proposal resolves existing conflicts in the SST disclosure debate by 
reconciling, or at least circumventing, the disparate understandings of 
“materiality” as the term applies to SSTs.  As described in this Note, while 
some argue that interactions with SSTs, due to their inherent ties to terrorism, 
are material to all investors, others contend that there are instances where a 
corporation’s interactions with SSTs are of little importance.239  This Note’s 
proposal requires disclosure of all business dealings with SSTs, eliminating 
conflicting interpretations of materiality that produce inconsistent 
interpretations.  Importantly, however, this proposal does not purport to label 
all SST interactions material.  Such a suggestion would likely receive 
backlash from critics who have already asserted that, for various reasons, 
many interactions with SSTs are immaterial.240  Further, an attempt to 
continue to solicit SST disclosures under the guise of materiality would 
inevitably fall short of capturing all important information, just as 
materiality-based disclosures currently do.241 
 
 238. See supra notes 113–14 and accompanying text. 
 239. Compare H.R. REP. NO. 108-221, at 151 (2003) (taking the position that all 
interactions with SSTs matter to investors), with SIFMA Letter, supra note 157, at 3 
(describing situations in which SST interactions would be immaterial).  See also supra text 
accompanying notes 134, 177. 
 240. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 241. See supra Part II.B.2. 
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This solution also avoids the adoption of a “materiality per se” approach, 
which would necessarily deem all SST interactions as material.242  
Materiality per se is a slippery argument in and of itself:  the notion as applied 
to SSTs argues that all interactions with SSTs will matter to investors.  This 
idea is inherently incorrect, and adopting such an approach would gloss over 
the underpinnings of the materiality standard.243  Inevitably, some dealing 
with SSTs will be so monetarily small or relationally removed from a 
corporation’s business that those dealings will not matter to a reasonable 
investor.  To apply a sweeping label of “materiality” to these dealings would 
be fundamentally wrong and would mangle traditional understandings of 
materiality. 
Adopting a line-item requirement in Regulation S-K that mandates the 
disclosure of all SST-related business is, therefore, beneficial because it 
avoids the materiality standard altogether.  Moreover, in rejecting a 
materiality per se approach, a Regulation S-K line item avoids undermining 
existing understandings of materiality in securities law.  This enhances the 
consistency of the existing inconsistent disclosure standards because much 
of the current debate concerns how to appropriately determine materiality 
when it comes to terrorism-adjacent activities.  After all, the aim of this Note 
is to propose a remedy that creates more effective and coherent regulations 
in the SST-disclosure space.  The necessary first step is to depart from 
materiality, a standard that yields inconsistent disclosure in a space rife with 
varying views on the importance of the implications of terrorism. 
2.  Continuing Benefits Afforded by SST Disclosure 
The heightened specificity of a new line-item requirement in Regulation 
S-K will also enhance the quality and quantity of SST disclosures by 
compelling corporations to reveal more information.  In turn, an addition to 
Regulation S-K allows for the continued benefits associated with SST 
disclosure expressed in Part II.B—namely, ensuring transparency that 
benefits the investors the disclosures serve,244 fulfilling demonstrated 
investor demand for such information,245 and contributing to socially 
beneficial practices achieved via the public scrutiny that accompanies 
disclosure.246 
To begin, SST disclosure requirements benefit the market through their 
information-forcing capabilities.247  This notion aligns with Former 
Chairman Cox’s strongly held view that the SEC’s role is to make 
 
 242. See supra note 199 and accompanying text. 
 243. See supra text accompanying notes 169–70 (discussing arguments in favor of 
preserving the “integrity” of the standard). 
 244. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 245. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 246. See supra Part II.A.3. 
 247. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
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information more readily available for the investing public.248  A clearer, 
more exacting, and more consistent disclosure requirement functions to 
further these goals by ensuring that corporations provide pertinent 
information to the investing public as part of their regular disclosures.249  The 
ultimate proposal of this Note increases transparency, which is a key feature 
of a disclosure-based regime.250  Transparency is even more desirable, given 
the existing evidence of investor demand for SST disclosures.251  Not only 
does a more precise standard for SST disclosures standardize the subsequent 
disclosures, it also increases transparency, benefitting both investors252 and 
the efficiency of the market as a whole.253 
A comprehensive Regulation S-K requirement resolves many of the 
critiques described above,254 enacting a clearer standard that increases 
exactitude.255  In turn, this proposal eliminates much of the ineffectiveness 
caused by inconsistent and unclear practices and ensures that the benefits 
associated with SST disclosures continue in the future. 
C.  Possible Weaknesses of This Proposed Solution 
Despite the benefits of a Regulation S-K addition requiring disclosure of 
all business in or with SSTs, this proposal will necessarily face criticism.  
Critics who are diametrically opposed to the SEC overseeing disclosures that 
are not traditionally financial in nature will denounce this solution as it 
maintains the status quo—the SEC continues as the principal regulator of 
SST disclosures.256  This criticism is further analyzed in Part III.C.1.  Part 
III.C.2 explains an additional pitfall of this proposal:  requiring heightened 
disclosures can be costly, creating the possibility of fraud liability for 
information that is not of any notable importance otherwise and for 
information that companies would not be compelled to disclose in the 
absence of heightened disclosure requirements.257 
 
 248. See Press Release, supra note 67; see also supra text accompanying note 127. 
 249. See generally supra note 69. 
 250. See supra notes 128–38 and accompanying text. 
 251. See supra Part II.A.2.  Moreover, given that there is a demand for this information, 
greater consistency in solicitation is a desirable goal.  Insufficient or inconsistent disclosure 
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the disclosures or not.  A Regulation S-K requirement thus serves to better fulfill investor 
demand than existing disclosure mechanisms do. 
 252. See supra note 16 (establishing the interests of investors as the principal concern of 
this Note). 
 253. See generally supra text accompanying notes 130–32. 
 254. See, e.g., supra Parts II.B.2, II.C (detailing the risk of ineffectiveness in current 
standards). 
 255. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 256. See supra Part II.B.1. 
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1.  Maintaining Regulation of SSTs Under the SEC 
A weakness of this Note’s proposal is that it fails to address the more 
sweeping concern that SST disclosure requirements are inherently 
problematic because the SEC should not regulate in this sphere.258  Any 
proposal seeking to retain some semblance of the current SST disclosure 
framework would fall victim to the same parallel critiques:  that the SEC is 
an inappropriate regulator and that there are other agencies better suited to 
the task.259  Given the compelling interests in retaining SST disclosure 
mechanisms in some form,260 it is difficult to propose a practical solution that 
would entirely eliminate this criticism.  The SEC, whether by the broad 
mandates of the materiality standard or the more narrowly tailored methods 
of comment letters and legislation pertaining to SST disclosure specifically, 
will likely continue to regulate in this sphere regardless. 
Nevertheless, the solution proposed by this Note at least cabins the 
authority of the SEC’s focus on a “political or foreign policy agenda.”261  
Specifically delineating a disclosure standard under Regulation S-K confines 
the SEC’s currently murky disclosure-forcing capabilities to notions of 
materiality disclosure already expressed in Regulation S-K.262  This solution 
ensures that the SEC continues to act consistently with its traditional agenda 
of overseeing disclosure of material information.263 
2.  Creating Costs for Companies Through Fraud Liability 
As explained in Part II.C.2, necessary considerations in any disclosure 
mechanism are the associated costs.264  These may include costs associated 
with gathering information265 and, inevitably, some degree of omissions 
liability where companies fail to disclose information that might be 
considered material to investors.266  However, a proposal that creates a 
Regulation S-K item that specifically gives rise to heightened SST disclosure 
requirements necessarily implicates additional costs:  costs associated with 
the increased risk of fraud liability. 
Again, when corporations disclose risk factors, they create statements on 
the basis of which fraud claims can be brought.267  This liability would not 
otherwise exist in a system where disclosure of certain information is not 
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mandated.  For example, the proposed addition to Regulation S-K requires 
disclosure of all business in or with SSTs.  This compels disclosure of certain 
statements that are neither currently captured under the provisions of 
materiality and existing items in Regulation S-K nor solicited via comment 
letters or the ITRA268 because the proposed standard requires more 
information mandated with greater specificity.  In turn, any misstatement in 
these disclosures, no matter how small or immaterial, risks fraud liability, 
and companies will inevitably face greater costs.  Such liability risk does not 
exist under current standards to this same degree because current standards 
do not mandate such sweeping disclosures.  Nevertheless, as discussed in 
Part II.C.2, costs of some form are inherent in any disclosure mechanism.  
This proposal therefore accepts increased fraud liability as a necessary hurdle 
in achieving more consistent SST disclosure practices. 
CONCLUSION 
This Note first addressed the designation of SSTs in the world:  Syria, Iran, 
North Korea, and Cuba.269  Then, this Note identified four different 
mechanisms that the SEC uses to solicit SST disclosures from corporations:  
the materiality standard, the provisions of Regulation S-K, comment letter 
solicitations, and requirements of the ITRA.270  The various standards at 
play, and their varying degrees of exactitude in the disclosures they require, 
create a disjointed framework for SST disclosure requirements.  Therefore, 
although SST disclosures theoretically ensure transparency, fulfill an 
existing investor demand, and lead to socially beneficial practices,271 the 
existing standards are not successfully accomplishing these aims because 
they are too inconsistent to produce a meaningful set of information. 
Developing a singular, cohesive standard that ensures that corporations 
make SST disclosures and that these disclosures are meaningful when 
compared to one another is critical to developing an effective disclosure 
system in the SST sphere.  An addition to Regulation S-K that unifies the 
existing mechanisms under one heightened requirement to disclose all 
business in or with SSTs solves many of these problems.  Although critics 
may be discontented with such a recommendation,272 this proposal maintains 
SST oversight under the umbrella of the SEC in a way that creates a stronger 
and fairer standard and introduces clarity to a discussion currently plagued 
with inconsistencies.  It is time for a clearer standard in SST disclosure. 
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